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Vasilis Politis’ book provides a new insight into Pla-
to’s early dialogues. !e purpose of the book is to de-
fend an ‘aporia-based account’ of Plato’s early dialogues 
against the common ‘de"nition-based account’. Tradi-
tionally, the early dialogues are read as ‘de"nitional’ in 
the sense that the ti esti question is seen as the central 
question motivating the inquiry, and as ‘aporetic’ in the 
sense that they generally end in the failure of Socrates 
and his interlocutors to answer the ti esti question. Usu-
ally, the failure is attributed to the incapacity of Socra-
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tes’ interlocutor to provide an answer to the ti esti ques-
tion which meets Socrates’ requirements, which are 
that the question should be answered by giving a uni-
tary, general and explanatory de"nition of Φ and not 
by pointing at an example. One problem with this view 
is that the reason for these requirements is either le  
unexplained, or it is explained dogmatically, by putting 
forward Plato’s own theory of knowledge, or it leaves 
room for suspicions of scepticism, the failure of the dia-
logue pointing to the impossibility of knowledge. Start-
ing from the di#culties raised by the traditional view, 
Politis develops a radically di$erent approach in which 
the ti esti question is not any more the central ques-
tion of the dialogue. Instead, he shows that the inquiry 
is motivated and structured by questions of the form 
‘whether or not Φ is Ψ’ which turn into aporiai when 
one or more of the interlocutors, a er having argued 
on both sides of the question, face a con%ict of reasons 
and it appears to them that there are equally good rea-
sons on both sides. Based on textual evidence, Politis’ 
central claim is that it is in order to "nd a way out of 
the aporia that the ti esti question, understood as the 
demand for a standard for a thing’s being Φ, is raised 
in these dialogues, and furthermore, that it is in order 
to unlock the particular case of ‘radical aporiai’, that 
is aporiai which render every example-and-exemplar 
questionable, that Socrates requires a unitary, general 
and explanatory de"nition. It is thus the understanding 
of the early dialogues as being primarily aporia-based 
dialogues which provides the key to the ti esti question. 
!e book is divided into two parts. Part I is dedicated 
to the criticism of the  ‘de"nition based-account’. Politis’ 
point is to show, against this view, that the ti esti ques-
tion stands in need for justi"cation, and consequently, 
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that the ti esti question cannot alone be the crux of the 
dialogue. !ree elements are put forward: "rst, the 
place of the ti esti question in the inquiry, which, Poli-
tis shows, is raised at di$erent places depending on the 
dialogue, including at the very end; secondly, Socrates’ 
requirement to answer the ti esti question by giving a 
unitary, general and explanatory de"nition, and not 
by pointing at an example; and, thirdly, the supposed 
bene"ts of answering the ti esti question, which ex-
plains why it is seen as an indispensable step by Socra-
tes and is pursued relentlessly. !e second point has, in 
particular, crystallised the attention of critics. On the 
whole, those who have recognised the need for justi-
"cation of the requirements for de"nitions have either 
argued against Plato that such a justi"cation is missing 
(Peter Geach, famously) or that the justi"cation is to be 
found in Plato’s theory of knowledge. Politis argues for 
a third way namely, that Plato’s justi"cation is indeed to 
be found in the dialogues — this is the whole point of 
Part II — but that it is not to be found in his theory of 
knowledge. Large sections of Part I are dedicated to the 
latter issue, which certainly constitutes one of the main 
strengths of the book. 
Part II is the constructive part of the book, where 
Politis argues that the raising and the pursuing of the 
ti esti question is in fact motivated by the emergence of 
an aporia within the dialogue. !e "rst step consists in 
establishing that the ti esti question is always preceded, 
or raised together with, one or many questions of the 
form ‘whether or not Φ is Ψ’. !is claim is based on 
the study of a large range of dialogues — Charmenides, 
Euthyphro, Republic I, Gorgias, Hippias Major, Laches, 
Protagoras, Meno, Lysis — which are brought under 
close examination. In a second step, Politis shows how 
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some of these whether-or-not questions articulate an 
aporia, that is a con%ict of reasons such that there ap-
pears to one and the same person to be genuinely good 
reasons on both sides of the whether-or-not question, 
and how then it is in order to "nd a way out of the apo-
ria that a ti esti question, that is the question for a stand-
ard of a thing’s being Φ, is raised. Again, the argument 
is carried through the careful study of four dialogues 
— Euthyphro, Charmides, Protagoras, Meno. Finally, 
Politis develops the notion of ‘radical aporia’ to explain 
that some aporiai are such that they render question-
able every example-and-exemplars of a thing’s being Φ, 
and that this is the reason why Socrates, in this precise 
situation, requires that the ti esti question must be an-
swered not by pointing at an example but by giving a 
unitary, general and explanatory de"nition of Φ. 
Politis’ book is undeniably of great value for the study 
of Plato’s early dialogues. Not only does it challenge the 
traditional view on the ti esti question, but it completely 
renews the role of aporiai in these dialogues. If aporiai 
still refer to a state of puzzlement, they are more fun-
damentally a decisive moment in an inquiry and they 
show that a further step is required in order to pursue 
the original issue. Given that whether-or-not questions 
naturally provide the ground for the emergence of apo-
riai, and given that, as Politis has shown, Plato in these 
dialogues takes the raising of whether-or-not questions 
as his starting-point, one could say in that sense that 
Plato is an aporetic thinker. However, this should not 
be interpreted in any way as implying that Plato is a 
sceptic. Politis devotes a chapter in Part II to refute this 
claim, which has being considered by Julia Annas and 
more recently defended by Michael Forster. Politis ar-
gues against this view that if there is indeed a sceptical 
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dimension in the method of aporia-based inquiries, the 
raising of the ti esti question shows on the contrary that 
the moment of the aporia is meant to be overcome. !e 
ability of Politis to tackle all these di$erent aspects of the 
topic is another major asset of this book. For instance, 
the apparent paradox of Socrates’ ignorance, who on 
the one side denies that he possesses any knowledge 
but on the other side defends some strong positions, 
a paradox which becomes acute in the Gorgias for in-
stance, is also addressed. Finally, the signi"cance of the 
book goes beyond the early dialogues. As the author 
himself puts it, the careful study of the raising of the ti 
esti question brings us to ‘the roots of Plato’s essential-
ism’, and as a result, it is likely that such an important 
change in the understanding of the role of the ti esti 
question in these dialogues will have consequences for 
our understanding of the theory of forms. In particular, 
the fact that only radical aporiai require answering the 
ti esti question with a unitary, general and explanatory 
de"nition could have implications for the question of 
whether there is a form for each and every thing. But 
this point goes well beyond the scope of the book, and 
accordingly, Politis does not deal with it. Nonetheless, 
this is another element which makes this book so valu-
able for any student of Plato and, I think, many students 
of philosophical method and enquiry. 
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